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EMPLOYEE DISCHARGED FOR CAUSE
THE RIGHT OF AN EMPLOYEE DISCHARGED
FOR CAUSE
By HERBERT D. LAUBE*
W HERE an employee is hired for a definite term under an en-
tire contract, he is not entitled to recover for services render-
ed if he is dismissed before the end of the term for good cause.
This rule is said to be unanimously supported by the English de-
cisions on the theory that a rightfully discharged employee, having
broken the contract, has no rights under it.' In principle, according
to Woodward,2 it would seem that if the cause of discharge involves
a breach of faith by the employee he should be regarded the same
as one who wilfully abandons his contract. However, the ancient
rule that an employee who is discharged for good cause forfeits
his right to compensation for services rendered has been repudiated
in the United States,3 and the employee is permitted to recover
upon quantum meruit the value of the services rendered prior to
his discharge, less such damages as the employer may have sus-
tained by reason of the employee's misconduct.'
LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY
Ordinarily, jurisdictions which allow recovery by an employee
who has wilfully abandoned his contract will also allow recovery
where he has been discharged for cause, provided, says Williston,
the cause does not involve dishonesty or intentional injury to the
*Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1(1907) 5 L. R. A. (N.S.) 524, 532. See also 2 Parsons, Contracts,
8th ed., 42.
2Woodward, Quasi Contracts, sec. 174 (1). p. 274. Cf. Williston,
Contracts, sec. 1477. In Lane v. Phillips, (1859) 6 Jones (N.C.) 455,
456, the court said: "Had the plaintiff wilfully and without excuse left the
defendant's service, he would, undoubtedly, both according to the principles
of the common law, and by force of our statute, have forfeited his
wages; White v. Brown, 2 Jones' Rep. 443; Revised Code, ch. 80. Is
it reasonable that he should be in any better condition by acting so
badly as to compel his employer to dismiss him?"
318 R. C. L. sec. 54. p. 539; 5 L. R. A. (N.S.) 524, 527; 20 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. of Law, 2nd ed., 43; Wood, Master and Servant, 2nd ed.,
sec. 129, p. 262; 43 Am. Dec. 205, 207.
439 C. J. sec. 251 (b); Murphy v. Sampson, (1902) 2 Neb. (Unof.)
297, 298, 96 N. W. 494.
5Williston, Contracts, sec. 1477.
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employer.' According to Woodward,
"If the discharge is due to the employee's want of skill or
strength or judgment he should be permitted to recover. This
distinction has received little recognition in the decisions, however,
and there are not a few cases in which an employee discharged for
deliberate misconduct has been afforded relief.
"If an employee neither wilfully abandons his employment,
nor is discharged by his employer, but nevertheless fails to satisfy
the requirements of his contract, the same test of good faith should
be applied. Thus, if he is discovered to have deliberately dis-
obeyed the instructions of his employer or to have deliberately
deceived or defrauded him, he should be denied compensation. "0
It is a disturbing fact, however, that some states which deny re-
covery to an employee who wilfully abandons his employment
allow him to recover where he has been discharged for mis-
conduct.
In Missouri, an employee who deliberately fails to perform the
conditions of his contract can recover nothing.' Yet, in Parks v.
Tolntan,8 the plaintiff, a single woman, entered into the service of
the defendant, being fully advised that the defendant would neither
employ, nor retain in his employment, a married woman. There-
after, the plaintiff secretly married and when the defendant learned
of it, she was discharged. In an action to recover for her services
prior to her discharge, the court said:
"And there is no evidence to show that her marriage interrupted
her service to the defendant or lessened it in value to him, or that
he was damaged or injured thereby. We are of the opinion that
it was defendant's right to employ single women only. And that
if a married woman contracted to serve him and did engage in
his service by concealing the fact that she was married thereby
deceiving him, he could on that account avoid and put an end to
the contract at any time he discovered that she was married.
". But it does not follow that in the absence of evidence of
harm or injury in any way, he can avoid payment for the value of
services performed and accepted before he does put an end to it,
and we are of the opinion that he cannot."'
Mississippi has denied recovery to an employee who deliberately
abandoned his contract of service because the court did not feel
that it was prepared to make so radical a change in the legal effect
of entire contracts by allowing the employee to recover.10 Yet,
6Woodward, Quasi Contracts, sec. 174 (1).1Laube, The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Re-Viewed,
(1935) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 825, 839.
8(1905) 113 Mo. App. 14, 87 S. W. 576.
SParks v. Tolman, (1905) 113 Mo. App. 14, 18, 87 S. W. 576.
loTimberlake v. Thayer, (1893) 71 Miss. 279, 281, 14 So. 446.
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Mississippi has approved an instruction to the jury that an over-
seer's contract for wages is not an entire contract, and although he
is turned off for misconduct, he may recover for the time he con-
ducted himself well."' In Illinois, an employee who abandons his
contract forfeits his wages,'1 2 yet in Hoffman v. World's ColumNbian
Expositimn,'3 the right of a properly discharged employee to re-
cover was declared to be so clear that "it needs no authority that
he is entitled to be paid until discharged."
The wavering attitude of the courts seems to have been ex-
cellently summarized by Page:
"In determining whether relief in quasi-contract will be given
to a plaintiff who is in default, the courts are frequently controlled
by two different considerations, which do not always lead to the
same practical result. On the one hand, the courts frequently
look to the benefit conferred upon the defendant by the partial per-
formance on the part of the plaintiff, and measure the plaintiff's
right to recover by the benefit which the defendant has received.
On the other hand, many courts also consider the character of the
breach on the part of- the plaintiff; and show a strong tendency to
grant relief to a plaintiff whose default is not due to his own wilful
or deliberate choice, while they deny relief to a plaintiff who has
performed a considerable part of the contract, but whose default
is due to his wilful and deliberate choice."'
'
f
The solution of the problem here involved would seem to be de-
pendent upon the evaluation of these two considerations, and the
extent to which either of them should be applied in any particular
case. To make the wilfulness of the conduct, generally, the basis
of denying recovery to the discharged employee, seems hard to
justify.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
When an employee deliberately leaves the service before the
end of his term without cause, in many jurisdictions, he loses his
right to the wages he has earned although the employer has suf-
fered no loss. But if the employer is guilty of a breach of the
same contract, he is liable only for the damages which result.",
Similarly, where an employee is discharged for wilful misconduct,
"Robinson v. Sanders, (1852) 24 Miss. 391.
12 Eldridge v. Rose, (1845) 7 Ill. 91; Swanzey v. Moore (1859) 22
Ill. 63; Angle v. Hanna, (1859) 22 Ill. 429.
23(1894) 55 Il. App. 290. Accord, Abendpost Co. v. Hertel, (1896)
67 Ill. App. 501.
146 Page, Contracts, sec. 3261, p. 5743.
'
5 Laube, The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Re-Viewed,
(1935) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 825, 839.
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in many jurisdictions, he can recover no compensation, even though
the employer sustains no loss. But if the employer wrongfully
discharges him, the employee can recover only the actual damage
which he has suffered, which is the wages for the remainder of the
term reduced by the wages which the employee earned, or could
have earned with reasonable diligence, during the unexpired term."0
Why should an employee forfeit his wages for wilful misconduct,
causing no loss, if an employer can cancel at pleasure any contract
of employment he has made, provided that he pay only such dam-
ages as the employee has actually suffered ?17 An early New York
case 8 tells us that the just claims of the employee are satisfied
when he is fully recompensed for his part performance and in-
demnified for his loss in respect to the part unexecuted, and to per-
sist in accumulating a larger demand is not consistent with good
faith toward the employer. In Illinois, when the interest of the
employer is at stake, the court proclaims that "just compensation
should, after all, be the end aimed at in suits for the breach of
contract."' 19
Although the employee who is guilty of a wilful misconduct is
denied any right to recover compensation for the services he has
rendered, yet reparation seems to be the measure of liability of
the defaulting employer. In Schroeder v. California Yukon Trad-
ing Co.,20 the plaintiff was discharged without cause. By an express
stipulation of the contract he was entitled to his wages for the
entire year. The court said:
"The libelant, while not disputing the general principle of law
that the measure of damages for breach of a contract is such sum
only as will compensate the innocent party for the loss sustained
by him, nevertheless contends that by express terms of his con-
tract he is entitled to a sum equal to the wages he would have earned
during the remainder of the year for which he was employed. This
contention cannot be sustained. . . . That stipulation, if enforced
according to its letter, would result in giving to the libelant more
than the compensation for the actual loss which he has sustained
on account of defendant's breach of contract; that is he would re-
cover in this action, by way of damages, a sum equal to what he
would have earned if he had fully performed his contract, and at
the same time he would be permitted to retain all he has earned
'6Hollwedel v. Duffy-Mott Co., (1933) 263 N. Y. 95, 101, 188 N. ..
266. Accord, Mt. Hope Cemetery Ass'n v. Weidenmann, (1891) 139
Ill. 67, 77, 28 N. E. 834; Wood, Master and Servant, 2nd ed., sec. 127.17Moore v. Howard, (1866) 18 La. Ann. 635; M'Kellar v. Macfarlane,
(1852) 15 Ct. Sess. (Scot.) 246, 247.
18 Clark v. Marsiglia, (1845) 1 Denio (N.Y.) 317, 319.
19Jones v. Dunton, (1880) 7 111. App. 580, 592.
20(D.C. Cal. 1899) 95 Fed. 296.
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since he was wrongfully discharged and all that he may earn sub-
sequent to the trial and during the remainder of the year for which
he was employed by the defendant. '"2 1
In other words, the employee can not enrich himself by the wrong-
ful breach of contract by his employer, even by express stipula-
tion in the contract itself.
WILFULNESS AS A TEST
Where an employee has wilfully failed to perform his contract
in full, the jurisdictions in which the character of his breach and
his intention are regarded as material, hold that he can not re-
cover in quasi-contract on the basis of the enrichment of the em-
ployer by his partial performance.2 2 But those jurisdictions which
regard the character of his breach and his intention as immaterial
have allowed the discharged employee to recover in quasi-contract
the reasonable value of the benefits, less damages for the breach,
even though his conduct was wilful.3  The question thus is:
Should the wilful character of the employee's conduct be regarded
as immaterial? On the part of the employer in wrongfully dis-
charging employees, wilfulness has generally been so regarded.
But as to the employee, the Massachusetts court has said:
"But we are of opinion that a vilful default in the performance
of a stipulation not going to the essence of the contract bars a re-
covery ... Where the plaintiff has honestly tried to perform his
contract, it is one thing to hold that it must have been the intention
to make the commission of such breach a condition precedent.
But where the default is wilful the question in our opinion is a
different one."'"
The court felt that one who had committed a wilful default and
still sought to recover, in effect, claimed a right to break his con-
tract, when he had no such right. An analysis of some of the
cases may be illuminating in revealing the unsoundness of any
such approach.
1. Use of Improper Language. In the early case of Byrd v.
Boyd,25 the plaintiff was employed for one year as overseer for
$180. He managed his crop well, but in July he used some abusive
language to the defendant's daughter, and was discharged. The
21Schroeder v. California Yukon Trading Co., (D.C. Cal. 1899) 95
Fed. 296, 297. Cf. Re Mathie and Acme Co., (1910) 13 West L. R. (Can.)
110.
226 Page, Contracts, sec. 3265, p. 5751.
226 Page, Contracts, sec. 3266, p. 5755.
24Sipley v. Stickney, (1906) 190 Mass. 43, 46, 76 N. E. 226.25(1827) 4 McCord (S.C.) 246.
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trial court in charging the jury advised them that they were not
at liberty, under any circumstances, to apportion the compensation
of the plaintiff for the services rendered. On appeal, this was held
a misdirection. The court said:
"It happens frequently too that it becomes a question of great
difficulty to ascertain with whom the first wrong commenced. I
cannot reconcile it to my notions of natural justice, that the over-
seer should not recover a compensation for the services, so far as
they were directed, and which have been beneficial to the employer.
And I am unable to discover any evil which is likely to result
from submitting such a matter to the sound discretion of a jury
of the country. And as a matter of expediency I should be dis-
posed to establish it as a rule. . . . Cases of this description are
of very frequent occurrence, and although this question has never
been judicially determined, it may be clearly collected from them,
that the prevailing opinion is favourable to an apportionment. '"2'
Although one may feel that the overseer's misconduct justified his
discharge, one may also endorse the attitude of the court that
"notions of natural justice" precluded penalizing the overseer more
than six months' salary for such deliberate misconduct.
The use of improper language in the service does not of itself
constitute a good ground for discharge; it must have been used
in the presence or hearing of the employer or his family. It is
said that no definite rule applicable to all cases can be given. The
right of discharge must necessarily depend upon the peculiar
circumstances of each case. But, says Wood,
"What might be regarded as improper or insolent in a servant
toward one master, might not be so regarded toward another.
Obscene and blasphemous language, used by a servant in the serv-
ice of a master who himself indulges in the same class of language,
could hardly be said to be so shocking to his moral sensibilities as
to warrant him in discharging the servant for that cause; but such
language used in the service of a master of refined tastes and keen
moral sensibilities, would furnish the very best of reasons for the
servant's discharge. 27
From this excerpt it would appear that the law is not interested in
the moral aspect of the employee's profanity, but rather in the
propriety and discretion with which he gives expression to his
vulgarity in the light of the time, place and circumstances. His
right seems to be dependent upon his adaptability in a large
26Byrd v. Boyd, (1827) 4 McCord (S.C.) 246, 248. In Timberlake
v. Thayer, (1893) 71 Miss. 279, 282, 14 So. 446, the court said, "The
South Carolina court put its decision expressly upon the ground of ex-
pediency . . ." In Cross v. Baseball Club, (1900) 84 Mo. App. 526, the
improper language was regarded as irrelevant.27Wood, Master and Servant, 2nd ed., sec. 110, p. 210.
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measure. When the employee is denied a right to recover after
having been discharged for such misconduct, the penalty for his
wilful act seems to be imposed for the wilfulness involved in the
indiscretion of which he has been guilty in shocking an employer
of delicate sensibilities. It is not based on any social interest in
general morals, except so far as bad faith 2 8 is manifested in the
breach of the contract when the employer is of fine moral quality.
It is the social interest in the integrity of such contracts which the
employee must preserve under penalty of forfeiture.29
2. Drunkenness. Generally, intoxication is a good ground for
discharging an employee, particularly where it interferes with the
performance of his duties. Of course, a minister who should be-
come intoxicated on any occasion would be subject to instant dis-
missal, because it is inconsistent with his position.30 Dismissal of
an employee probably would not be justified if the intoxication
were an isolated act committed at some festival frolic, not affect-
ing the employer's business.3' But, where intoxication unfits an
employee to perform his duties, his discharge is justified." In
an Alabama case, the court said:
"We do not doubt that public drunkenness of any employee,
while in the service of the employer, and manifesting itself in
boisterous and disorderly conduct, either toward the employer or
third persons, is such misconduct as to constitute a violation of
the stipulation, implied in every contract of service, that the em-
ployee will conduct himself with such decency and politeness of de-
portment as not to work injury to the business of the employer.
This he can do by a single act of drunkenness, which may tend
to offend the reasonable prejudices or tastes of the public, or impair
28in Development Co. of America v. King, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1908) 161
Fed. 91, 93, the court said, "A master has the right to give reasonable
orders to a servant, even though he knows the work required is distasteful.
He may give them with the expectation that the servant will leave his
employment rather than obey. He may even give them for the express
purpose, as stated in the charge, of 'getting rid' of the servant. The
motive of the master in giving an order is not important. Whether the
order is reasonable is all-important. A servant is bound to obey reason-
able orders given in bad faith."29
"Wherever there are strong conflicting interests or divergent ideals
of justice and whenever groups or classes are asserting claims which do
not admit of easy reconciliation, there is likely to be vigorous complaint
of the want of accord of law with the individual moral sense." Pound,
Criminal Justice in America 42.
3OWood, Master and Servant, 2nd ed., sec. 113, p. 216. Tiffany,
Domestic Relations, 3rd ed., 588.
31Clouston v. Corry, [1906] A. C. 122, 129, 75 L. J. P. C. 20, 93
L. T. 706, 54 W. R_ 382, 22 T. L. R. 107.32Physioc v. Shea, (1885) 75 Ga. 466; McCormick v. Demary, (1880)
10 Neb. 515, 7 N. W. 283; Dunkell v. Simons, (1889) 15 Daly (N.Y.)
352, 7 N. Y. S. 655.
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their confidence, or render him disagreeable in social or business
intercourse .... It may prove, also, equally offensive to the master
or employer, who may justly regard sobriety as an indispensable
element of efficient service." 3
It has been held that although intoxication unfits an employee to
perform service, he is still entitled to just compensation for the
services he actually rendered. 3' But for a master of a vessel to
become incapacitated through drunkenness on a voyage is the
gravest kind of a fault, and he clearly forfeits his claim to wages."
Where the Railway Act makes intoxication of the conductor and
other employees while in service a crime,3" it would be difficult to
justify recovery of wages by the employee for services rendered
when discharged for such a cause.
Generally, workmen's compensation acts deny compensation
for any injury or death which is caused by the wilful misconduct
of the employee or which is due to his own intoxication." The
workmen's compensation acts were passed for the benefit of the
employees who came within its provisions. The social interest in
the employee motivated their enactment. To allow an employee
to recover under them for injuries suffered as a result of intoxica-
tion or his own wilful conduct is to allow him to enrich himself at
the expense of his employer.
3. Incompetence. Because of the implied condition in every
contract of service that the employee is competent to discharge the
duties for which he is employed, the employer may refuse to con-
tinue him in his employ if he is incompetent and inefficient."
Woodward would allow a recovery by the employee who is dis-
charged for want of skill; but Eversley says that he who can not,
is much the same as he who will not perform. 9 Want of skill is
reckoned as culpa.4 Although an employee has fully served his
term, some authorities favor denying him all compensation if the
want of skill goes to the essence of the contract.41 Pennsylvania
refuses to subscribe to "the doctrine that a man who holds himself
33Bass Furnace Co. v. Glasscock, (1886) 82 Ala. 452, 454, 2 So. 315.
Cf. Morgan v. Sheltoa, (1876) 28 La. Ann. 822.34Foster v. Watson, (1855) 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 377.35M'Kellar v. Macfarlane, (1852) 15 Ct. Sess. (Scot.) 246. Cf.
Anderson v. Wishart, (1818) 1 Mur. (Scot.) 429.39Marshall v. Central Ont. Ry. Co., (1897) 28 Ont. R. 241.
37U. S. Bur. of Labor Stat., (1929) Bulletin, No. 496, 259.3 Note 49 A. L. R. 472, 473.39Eversley, Domestic Relations, 4th ed., 892.
40Dig. 50, 17, 132.41Finch, J., dissenting in Weill v. Goodman, Shirt Waists, (1918)
102 Misc. Rep. 524, 526, 169 N. Y. S. 47. Cf. McCaskey v. Cumberland
Glass Mfg. Co., (1919) 188 App. Div. 288, 291, 176 N. Y. S. 798.
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out to the world as skilled in a particular branch of industry, and
who undertakes to perform a piece of work in his appropriate art,
is entitled to compensation, on a quantum meruit, whatever the
consequences resulting from his imperfect performance, unless
there has been gross negligence or wilful misconduct."' 1- If the
employee is fully advised of the character of the duties of his em-
ployment and deliberately undertakes them and fails, quite clearly
if the implied condition of the contract is to be treated realistical-
ly, his non-performance is wilful if the situation is looked at
objectively as the Pennsylvania court viewed it. One who is clumsy,
inexperienced and wanting in skill, and still professes to be able to
perform with reasonable skill, is quite as culpable as one who is
skilled and fails to perform. The difference is largely one of time.
The culpability of one is in entering the contract; the culpability
of the other is in not performing. However, Maine has made tie
distinction which Woodward contended was a sound one. 3 Re-
covery is often allowed where the employee is discharged for want
of skill or diligence.44
4. Disobedience. How the class atmosphere in which men live
determines the" premises of their thought is excellently illustrated
in some of the early English cases.45 In Spain v. Arnott," a farm
hand, who was hired for a year, was discharged for disobeying his
employer's orders. The plaintiff usually breakfasted at about five
o'clock in the morning and dined at two in the afternoon. Although
dinner was ready on this particular day, the master ordered the
servant to go with the horses down to the marsh, which was a
mile off. The plaintiff insisted that he had done his due and
would not go until he had dinner. Thereupon, lie was told to go
about his business, and he went. He is now suing for wages for
his services from Michaelmas to July. Lord Ellenborough said:
"If the contract be for a year's service, the year must be com-
pleted, before the servant is entitled to be paid.
"If the plaintiff persisted in refusing to obey his master's
orders, I think he was warranted in turning him away. He might
have obtained relief by applying to a magistrate; but lie was not
bound to pursue that course, the relation between master and
servant, and the lavs by which that relation is regulated, existed
42Waugh v. Shunk (1852) 20 Pa. St. 130, 133.43Lawrence v. Gullifer, (1854) 38 Me. 532.44DuQuoin Star Coal Mining Co. v. Thorwell, (1879) 3 Ill. App.
394; Alberts v. Stearns, (1883) 50 Mlich. 349, 15 N. W. 505; Sugg v.
Blow, (1852) 17 Mo. 359.45Laube, The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Re-Viewed,
(1935) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 825, 847.46(1817) 2 Starkie 256.
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long before the statute. There is no contract between the parties,
except that which the law makes for them, and it may be hard
upon the servant, but it would be exceedingly inconvenient if the
servant were to be permitted to set himself up to control his master
in his domestic regulations, such as the time of dinner."4
If one concedes that the dismissal was justified, still one sympa-
thizes with Lord Ellenborough's attitude that to compel a farm
laborer to fast for more than nine hours between breakfast and
dinner under penalty of losing several months' wages is rather
hard.
The controlling influence which the governing class has in
shaping legal rules manifests itself in Turner v. Mason,48 decided
in 1845. The plaintiff was engaged to serve as housemaid for
£7 a year. She was under a duty to continue in service one month
after notice or warning. An action of assumpsit was brought by
her for wrongful discharge. The plea was that she absented her-
self from the defendant's service for a day and a night against his
wishes. The replication disclosed that the mother of the maid was
suddenly seized with a violent illness and was in imminent peril of
death. She requested the defendant to give her leave to absent
herself, which was refused. The defendant demurred to the re-
plication. The following excerpts, cast as colloquy, represent what
followed:
COUNSEL: "Again, is she to forego in his service all moral
claims and obligations? He does not allege that her excuse was
false, or that her absence was inconvenient."
PARKE, B.: "This is wilful disobedience of orders."
COUNSEL: "There may be good reason for that."
ALDERSON, B.: "Surely it is a lawful order not to stay out all
night."
PARKE, B.: "Now here the replication alleges the extreme ill-
ness of the plaintiff's mother, but does not say the plaintiff gave
the defendant notice of that fact; it only says that was the ground
on which she applied for his permission, but not that she coin-
municated it."
ALDERSON, B.: "If the mother be very poor, is the daughter to
absent herself from her service to work for her, to prevent her
starving ?"
POLLOCK, C. B.: "Or, if she has the right to go to the deathbed
of her mother or her father, why not of any other near friend ?"
COUNSEL: "The replication alleges expressly that the defendant
had no need of her services."
PARKE, B.: "The master is to be the judge of the circumstances
under which the servant's services are required, subject to this,
47Spain v. Arnott, (1817) 2 Starkie 256, 257.
48(1845) 14 M. & W. 112, 114.
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that he is to give only lawful commands .... Even if the replica-
tion shewed that he had notice of the cause of her request to
absent herself, I do not think it would be sufficient to justify her in
disobedience to his order; there is not any imperative obligation
on a daughter to visit her mother under such circumstances, al-
though it may be unkind and uncharitable not to permit her.' ' 5
ALDERSON, B.: "We are to decide according to the legal obliga-
tions of parties. Where is a decision founded upon mere moral
obligation to stop? What degree of sickness, what nearness of
relationship, is to be sufficient? It is the safest way, therefore, to
adhere to the legal obligations arising out of the contract between
the parties."50
Four learned judges were of one opinion, judgment must be for
the master. Only considerations of self-preservation could justify
a servant in departing from the duties imposed by contract. This
case was decided eleven years after Britton v. Turner.5" Let us
concede that in an action for damages for wrongful discharge, the
decision on the demurrer was correct. In an action for wages
earned, it would not have been. The climates of opinion toward
labor 52 in England and the United States as represented by these
two cases are as diverse as the hemispheres in which the two
courts sat. For that reason it is difficult to understand how courts
in the United States can be so shocked at the violation of an em-
ployee's contract that he is penalized by forfeiture of wages when
he so defaults, and yet resent the suggestion that punitive damages
should be imposed upon the employer when he is likewise in de-
fault, because punitive damages never are awarded for a mere
breach of contract.5"
49 Wood, Master and Servant, 2nd ed., p. 228n., says: "It is true,
there is no imperative legal duty upon a daughter to visit a dying
mother, but a daughter who knew that her mother was dying, and she
was within easy distance of her and did not visit her, would be regarded
as destitute of the ordinary instincts of humanity, and most people who
are fit to have servants at all would hardly care to keep a person in their
employ who exhibited such heartlessness."
5OIn commenting on Turner v. Mason, the Michigan court has said:
"No other case seems to go quite so far, but 'wilful disobedience' of
orders is the general phrase used as justifying a discharge; and in
some few cases the courts have gone quite far in requiring an extreme
rule of duty. But this doctrine, which is certainly a harsh, if not inhuman
one, has not received entire favor, and has been confined to menial
domestic service. In employments not menial and domestic, the case has
been left to the jury with more or less latitude for the exercise of good
sense." Shaver v. Ingham, (1886) 58 Mich. 649, 653, 26 N. W. 162.
Cf. Riggs v. Horde, (1860) 25 Tex. Supp. 456. 78 Am. Dec. 584. See
also Wilson v. Simson, (1844) 6 Ct. Sess. (Scot.) 1256; Hamilton v.
M'Lean, (1824) 3 Ct. Sess. (Scot.) 379.
51(1834) 6 N. H. 481.
52Russell, Principles of Social Reconstruction 42.53Laube, The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Re-Viewed,
(1935) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 825, 833.
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The rule is thoroughly established that the disobedience of a
reasonable order is ground for the discharge of an employee."'
An employer has the right to the control and management of his
business. When he gives directions as to the methods of conduct-
ing his business and the manner in which his employees shall do
their work, it is then the duty of the employee to perform that
work in accordance with the employer's directions.' Where an
employee intentionally violates a rule of the shop against smoking,
the employer has the right to discharge him. 6 But should the
employee be compelled to forfeit his wages because of his wilful
violation of the rule against smoking? When an employee wil-
fully refuses to return to his employer certain samples which he
has in his possession, it is a sufficient ground for discharge.57
Should he be compelled to forfeit his wages on account of such
misconduct? Failure to follow a route prescribed by the em-
ployer is ground for dismissal of an employee.5 8 But, where the
employer requires that his employee shall keep his credit good,55
is deliberate failure to do so basis for forfeiting his excess wages
to his employer, where his wages have been garnished? According
to Tiffany, by the better opinion, especially in the case of me-
chanics, clerks in stores and other servants not menial, the act of
disobedience, to justify dismissal, must involve injury to the
master.60 If that is true, the act of disobedience justifying dis-
missal ought not per se to entail a forfeiture.
5. Insolence. Unprovoked insolence or disrespect on the part
of an employee toward his employer, while actually in service, is
ground for discharge.6 ' But, in an early Scottish case,6 2 when the
gardener, who was hired for a year, was requested by his employer
54Notes 37 L. R. A. (N.S.) 950; Ann. Cas. 1916A 1027.
"H. C. Bay Co. v. Kroner, (1925) 83 Ind. App. 541, 544, 149 N. E.
184. See also Peniston v. John Huber Co., (1900) 196 Pa. St. 580, 582, 46
Atl. 934.
'8Forsyth v. McKinney, (1890) 56 Hun 1, 8 N. Y. S. 561; Honig-
stein v. Hollingsworth, (1902) 39 Misc. 314, 79 N. Y. S. 867.57Shields v. Carson, (1902) 102 Ill. App. 38.
,
8Ball v. Livonia Salt & Mining Co., (1894) 8 Misc. Rep. 333, 28
N. Y. S. 537. Cf. McCain v. Desnoyers, (1895) 64 Mo. App. 66 where
the employee failed to write daily as to his whereabouts, so that he
could be instructed.
59Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Cox, (1911) 145 Ky. 667, 141 S. W.
389. 6OTiffany, Domestic Relations, 3rd ed., 591.
6
"Note, Ann. Cas. 1916A 1016. As a matter of law, Schafer v.
Thurston & Mfg. Co., (1927) 48 R. I. 244, 245, 137 Ati. 2.
62Thomson v. Douglas, (1807) Hume (Scot.) 392. Cf. Silvie v.
Stewart, (1830) 8 Ct. Sess. (Scot.) 1010.
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to help in the turnip field, he refused to do so in an uncivil fashion
because he had enough to do in the garden. He was dismissed
from the service. Although the Lords did not by any means ap-
prove of the gardener's conduct, they did not think it so highly
blamable as to require a forfeiture of his place and his wages.
"The relation of master and servant imposes upon each, touch-
ing the work to be performed, the duty to be reasonably respect-
ful to the other both in words and behavior, and to refrain from
insolent or imperious conduct. Among the obligations resting
upon the servant as an implied term of the contract is that he shall
not be insubordinate but shall show just regard for the rights
and person of the employer. The reciprocal obligation of the
master is that he shall not be arrogant or excite resentment, or
wantonly wound the feelings of his employee. But petty annoy-
ances and trifling irritations are likely in many kinds of employ-
ment. Not every act of discourtesy or every slight disrespect jus-
tifies a termination of the relation. Insubordination imports a wil-
ful disregard of express or implied directions and a refusal to
obey reasonable orders. When this is established, it is such a
breach of duty on the part of the servant as to warrant his dis-
charge.1
63
Cases have been frequent where the issue was as to whether
the insolence of the employee was justified by the master's pro-
vocation.64 The employee may be over-sensitive or the employer
may be over-dignified. 65 Or when each has an interest to protect,
they may be equally sensitive when that issue is involved, as when
the compensation of the employee is dependent on the profits of
the employer.
When an employee is discharged for cause before extra com-
pensation or a bonus becomes payable, he can not recover the
extra compensation even proportionally according to the time
served, because he has not performed the condition. 6 The diffi-
culty of enforcing any such rule is well illustrated in a recent
Illinois case.67 The plaintiff was employed by the year as manager
of one of the departments of the defendant's store. After seven
years, contrary to his practice, the employer asserted, what seems
63Mdntosh v. Abbott, (1918) 231 Mass. 180, 182, 120 N. E. 383.
6O4ehme v. Whittemore-Wright Co., Inc., (1932) 279 Mass. 558;
181 N. E. 733; Ross v. Grand Pants Co., (1913) 170 Mo. App. 291, 156
S. W. 475; Edwards v. Levy, (1860) 2 F. & F. 94.65Ernst v. Grand Rapids Engraving Co., (1912) 173 Mich. 254, 138
N. W. 1050.
66Note, 28 A. L. R. 346, 349. See also Griffin Grocery Co. v. Thaxton,
(1928) 178 Ark. 736, 11 S. W. (2d) 473; McGregor v. Harm, (1910)
19 N. D. 599, 125 N. W. 885.
67White v. Mandel Bros., (1928) 248 11. App. 313. But see Speiden
v. Innis, Speiden & Co., Inc., (1926) 216 App. Div. 408, 215 N. Y. S. 515.
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clearly to have been his right, the right to fix prices at an inventory
sale. The manager, thinking that his employer's conduct would
affect his right to additional compensation, told his employer
that it was "a dirty, crooked trick," which he "couldn't get away
with." The plaintiff was discharged instantly, just ten days before
the end of his period of service. The court felt that the use of
such language to a superior justified his discharge. But the for-
feiture of $12,000 as additional compensation for services, ten
days before the end of his term of service, was so disproportionate
to any loss that the employer could have sustained that it seemed
an oppressive exaction. The forfeiture of such a sum was held
too unconscionable to enforce. It would seem that the enrich-
ment of the employer can never be justified by the fact that he
had to discharge an employee who was insolent, if he suffered no
damage as a result of it.
6. Disloyalty. An agent owes to his principal a fidelity which
places him under a duty not to entice other employees to leave
their employment pending their contract. 8 It is disloyal conduct
which entails a forfeiture of his wages for the term."" An em-
ployee who makes derogatory statements concerning his company's
financial condition, may not only injure it, but threaten it with
bankruptcy.70 For an employee to engage secretly in business as
a rival of his employer is monstrous. It not merely violates his
contract, but goes to the essence of it"l and places him in an attitude
of hostility to his employer." For an employee to solicit and receive
a secret profit not only violates good faith but furthers his self-
interest at the expense of his employer.7 3 It is contrary to good
morals because it is fraud upon his employer. 74 To forbid the
6 8Perfection Mattress & Spring Co. v. Dupree, (1927) 216 Ala.
303, 308, 113 So. 74; Abrahamson v. Dry Goods Refolding Co., Inc.,(App. Term 1917) 166 N. Y. S. 771.
69Turner v. Robinson, (1833) 5 B. & Ad. 789.TODayton Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Brown, (1927) 116 Ohio St. 373, 374.
156 N. E. 136. Cf. Katz v. Goodman, (App. Term 1919) 176 N. Y. S. 488.
71McCaskey v. Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co., (1919) 188 App. Div.
288, 291, 176 N. Y. S. 798.T2Myers v. Roger J. Sullivan Co., (1911) 166 Mich. 193, 196, 131
N. W. 521. See also Hibbard v. Wood, (1912) 49 Pa. Super. Ct. 513.
Cf. Hopkins v. Convy, (1920) 191 Iowa 402, 178 N. W. 329; Levy v.
Jarrett, (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) 198 S. W. 333.
73Little v. Phipps, (1911) 208 Mass. 331, 333, 94 N. E. 260; Ackerman
v. Siegel, (App. Term 1918) 170 N. Y. S. 522; Marshall v. Sackett &
Wilhelms Co., (1917) 181 App. Div. 157, 168 N. Y. S. 259; Stubbs v.
Slater [1910] 1 Ch. 195, 203, appeal allowed [1910 1 Ch. 632, 79 L. J.
Ch. 420, 120 L. T. 444. See also 21 R. C. L. sec. 11, p. 827.74Jeffries v. Robbins, (1903) 66 Kan. 427, 437, 71 Pac. 852; New
Jersey Asbestos Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1920)
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employee to act in opposition to the interests of his employer is a
rule of common sense and common honesty.-, Where self-interest
impels an agent to over-reach his principal, the law will strip him
of the benefits which he has acquired at the expense of his prin-
cipal.7e The interests of justice and security prescribe the salutary
rule that selfishness and greed shall not be encouraged." An
employee may not profit by the advantage which he obtains by vir-
tue of his employment.
Reparation for the fraud is not regarded an adequate remedy
when an agent betrays his principal by obtaining an unjust advan-
tage. Owing to the imperfection of human institutions, the injured
party may be unable either to discover or to prove the extent of
such fraud to entitle him to redress." As a result, an agent who
defrauds his principal forfeits his right to compensation for his
services as a penalty for his fraudulent conduct." Indeed such
conduct has been made a crime.1°
7. Theft. If a servant robs his master, he may dismiss him
without notice and need not pay him month's wages." Where
a shipman steals his employer's silverware, he may not recover
anything for his services, regardless of the value of the article
stolen. 2 Where an employee embezzles money from his employer,
to allow him to recover the value of his services less what he has
stolen would neither subserve the ends of justice nor tend to
264 Fed. 509; Wadsworth v. Adams, (1891) 138 U. S. 380, 11 Sup.
Ct. 303, 34 L. Ed. 984.
7521 R. C. L. sec. 10, p. 825. No man should be allowed to have an
interest against his duty. Dieringer v. Meyer, (1877) 42 Wis. 311, 313.76Harrison v. Craven, (1905) 188 Mo. 590, 608, 87 S. W. 962.
7Tjansen v. Williams, (1893) 36 Neb. 869, 876, 55 N. W. 279. See
also Elco Shoe Mfrs., Inc. v. Sisk, (1932) 260 N. Y. 100, 183 N. E.
191; Brown v. Dupuy, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1924) 4 F. (2d) 367. Cf. Pungs
v. American Brake-Beam Co., (1900) 124 Mich. 344, 82 N. W. 1066.78Jansen v. Williams, (1893) 36 Neb. 869, 877, 55 N. W. 279.
79Doss v. Long Prairie Levee Dist., (1910) 96 Ark. 451, 132 S. W. 443;
Porter v. Silvers, (1871) 35 Ind. 295; Vennum v. Gregory, (1866) 21
Iowa 326; Ranney v. Henry, (1910) 160 Mich. 597, 125 N. W. 693;
Walker v. John Hancock Ins. Co., (1911) 80 N. J. L. 342, 79 Ati. 354;
Whaples v. Fahys, (1903) 87 App. Div. 518, 84 N. Y. S. 793; Lichtenstein
v. Case, (1904) 99 App. Div. 570, 91 N. Y. S. 57; Kinney v. Mahoning
Mills, (1900) 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 573; Wilkinson v. McCullough, (1900)
196 Pa. St. 205, 46 AtI. 357; Cotton v. Rand, (1899) 93 Tex. 7, 51 S. \V.
838; Jackson v. Pleasanton, (1903) 101 Va. 282, 43 S. E. 573; Blum v.
Palace Garage Co., (1934) 214 Wis. 319, 252 N. W. 177; Quirk v.
Quirk, (C.C.Pa. 1907) 155 Fed. 199; Hutchinson v. Fleming, (1908) 40
Can. Sup. Ct. 134.
SOLittle v. Phipps, (1911) 208 Mass. 331, 94 N. E. 260.
8lCunningham v. Fonblanque, (1833) 6 Car. & P. 44.
82Brown v. Croft, (1833) 6 C. & P. 16n.
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promote common honesty.8 3 Who can say that the services of a
dishonest employee are worth anything? It is a narrow view to
regard the interest of the employer alone in the matter.8 4  But
flagrant acts of dishonesty or crime, which seriously affect the
interest of the employer may well bar recovery of wages, although
the amount appropriated is less than the wages due.8 5 However,
it has been said that the principal ought not to extend so far as to
bar recovery where the contract is at an end.80 And, in a Ten-
nessee case, although the court thought the services of an embezzler
would ordinarily be regarded as worthless, yet it favored submitting
the matter to the jury.81
Wi LFULNESS: A DEFECTIVE TEST
The distinguishing characteristic of sound thinking is facing
the facts. 8 Sonorous generalities often make a problem incapable
of solution. 8 To deny the right of an employee who has been
discharged to recover because his conduct has been wilful seems
a pure verbalization. Wilfulness has such a variability of content
that to make it a test of non-recovery by the discharged employee
is empty formalism, although it is the test which the Restatement
of Agency, as well as the Restatement of Contracts, has adopted."0
The meaning of wilfulness when translated into concrete situations
is as diverse as the misconduct to be observed. The problem is
not to be solved on the basis of will, but upon the basis of inter-
ests.91 It involves the criteria of value. The purpose of dealing
with the variety of situations which have been set forth was to
discover the interests which should be given recognition by the
law, whether individual or social, of substance or of morals.
83 Peterson v. Mayer, (1891) 46 Minn. 468, 49 N. W. 245.
84Libhart v. Wood, (1841) 1 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 265, 268. Contra,
Massey v. Taylor, Wood & Co., (1868) 45 Tenn. 447.
85Note 13 L. R. A. 72.
SGLibhart v. Wood, (1841) 1 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 265.
"
7Massey v. Taylor, Wood & Co., (1868) 45 Tenn. 447. See also
Kowalski v. McAdoo, (1919) 93 N. J. L. 340, 107 Atl. 477.
"'Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy 140.
89Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy 199.
"ODewey, How We Think 135. See Restatement, Agency, see. 456;
Restatement, Contracts, sec. 357. See also Williston, The Defaulting Em-
ploye-A Correction, (1935) 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 68.
"And so the American Law Institute believes that it can help simple-
minded lawyers by giving an artificial and arbitrary picture of the
principles in terms of which human disputes are supposed to be settled."
Robinson, Law and the Lawyers 36.
"'Pound, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 89.
o2Pound, Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence 60.
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Although wilfulness has been made a test of right by eminent
authority,93 to classify conduct on the basis of it alone seems too
crude to be helpful. To be wilful conduct it is not necessary that the
conduct should be fraudulent, that it should involve any moral ob-
liquity, pecuniary or otherwise. 94 Often, in a contract of employment,
discontent, distrust and aversion arise on the part of the parties
to it.95 Deliberate insubordination should be ground for discharge,
but if no moral turpitude is involved except the deliberate conduct
which justifies the termination of the contract by the employer, for-
feiture of wages, in the absence of loss to the employer, seems
without warrant.98  For the wilful misconduc9 7 of the employer
93Beach v. Mullin, (1870) 34 N. J. L. 343; Huntingdon v. Claffin,(1868) 38 N. Y. 182; Turner v. Kouwenhoven, (1885) 100 N. Y. 115,
2 N. E. 637; Waters v. Davies, (1887) 23 Jones & Spencer (N.Y.) 39;
Leacock v. Striker, (C.P. Gen. Term 1890) 10 N. Y. S. 540; Walsh v.
New York & Kentucky Co., (1903) 88 App. Div. 477, 85 N. Y. S. 83; Slater
v. Detroit Graphite Co., (1925) 125 Misc. Rep. 183, 210 N. Y. S. 478;
Lane v. Phillips, (1859) 6 Jones (N.C.) 455; Voelckel v. Banner Brewing
Co., (1895) 9 Ohio Cir. Ct. 318, 2 Ohio Dec. 168; Libbart v. Wood,(1841) 1 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 265; Ackin v. Acton, (1830) 4 C. & P.
208; Turner v. Robinson, (1833) 6 C. & P. 15; Ridgway v. Hungerford
Market Co., (1835) 3 Ad. & E. 171; Anderson v. Wishart, (1818) 1
Mur. (Scot.) 429; M'Kellar v. Macfarlane, (1852) 15 Ct. Sess. (Scot.)
246.
Contra: Bixby v. Parsons, (1882) 49 Conn. 483; Fulton v. Heffel-
finger, (1899) 23 Ind. App. 104, 54 N. E. 1079; Hoffman v. World's
Columbian Exposition, (1894) 55 Ill. App. 290; Abendpost Co. v. Hertel,(1896) 67 Ill. App. 501; Foster v. Watson, (1855) 16 B. Mon. (Ky.)
377; Dorsey v. Clarke, (1928) 223 Ky. 619, 4 S. W. (2d) 748; Grafton v.
Collins, (1824) 3 Mart. (N.S.) (La.) 156; Lambert v. King, (1856)
12 La. Ann. 662; Ford v. Danks, (1861) 16 La. Ann. 119; Robinson v.
Sanders, (1852) 24 Miss. 391; Parks v. Toman, (1905) 113 Mo. App.
14, 87 S. W. 576; Hale v. Sheehan, (1893) 36 Neb. 439, 54 N. W. 682;
Murphy v. Sampson, (1902) 2 Neb. (Unof.) 297, 96 N. W. 494; Pullen
v. Green, (1876) 75 N. C. 215; Geraghty v. Pitcarn, (1932) 104 Pa.
Super. Ct. 72, 157 Atl. 634; Byrd v. Boyd, (1827) 4 McCord (S.C.)
246; Eakin v. Harrison, (1827) 4 McCord (S.C.) 249; M'Clure v. Pyatt,(1826) 4 McCord (S.C.) 26; Jones v. Jones, (1853) 32 Tenn. 605; Massey
v. Taylor, Wood & Co., (1868) 45 Tenn. 447; Hunter v. Litterer, (1873)
1 Bax: (Tenn.) 168; Shute & Lamont v. McVitie, (Tex. Civ. App. 1903)
72 S. W. 433; Peacock v. Coltrane, (1906) 44 Tex. Civ. App. 530,
99 S. W. 107; Matson v. Stewart, (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) 124 S. W.
736; Hildebrand v. American Fine Art Co., (1901) 109 Wis. 171, 85 N. W.
268. See also (1901) 15 Harv. L. Rev. 73.94Smith v. Thompson, (1849) 8 C. B. 44, 51, 18 L. J. C. P. 314.9
"Humphrey v. Johnson, (1920) 73 Ind. App. 551, 555, 127 N. E.
819.
91Cf. Wood, Master and Servant, 2nd ed., sec. 118, p. 224.97
"A breach of contract is wilful and deliberate . . . only when
the agent in complete disregard of his contractual obligations fails
to perform or misperforms the promised services and has no substantial
moral excuse for so doing or is guilty of disloyal or grossly insub-
ordinate conduct." Restatement, Agency, sec. 456(c). See also sec.
455, sec. 380 and sec. 409. Cf. Restatement, Contracts, sec. 270 and sec.
357.
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who compels the employee to abandon his employment, the em-
ployee can recover the reasonable value of his services or damages
for breach of contract.9" Ought the employer to have any greater
immunity when sued by a defaulting employee?
To fail deliberately to remit money to an employer in accord-
ance with the terms of his contract warrants discharging the em-
ployee. 9  Should the employee be required to forfeit his wages
on that account? Some courts can not perceive a difference
between one who refuses to comply with his contract and one who
compels his employer to discharge him on account of fraud. 100
Should a confidential clerk, who gambles on the stock exchange, 101
forfeit his wages for his misconduct? The answer depends upon
the interests which are involved.
When misconduct is a source of damage, motive is of no conse-
quence. When misconduct is not a source of damage, motive
acquires significance. What significance? Although a single
woman is guilty of deceiving her employer when she secretly
marries and wilfully breaks her contract, should the law enrich
the employer by relieving him of the necessity of paying her for
her services when he discharges her? Why should the employee
be regarded any differently by the law when he wilfully swears at
his employer, than his employer is regarded when he wilfully
swears at the employee? The conduct is equally reprehensible.
Should the employee forfeit his wages when he wilfully violates
a rule of the shop against smoking? If it is merely a question of
discipline, his discharge would seem a sufficient penalty. But, if
the reason of the rule was the high inflammability of chemicals used
in the shop, his wanton, reckless conduct may merit a forfeiture.
There is a vast difference between drunkenness when indulged in
by an unskilled manual laborer, and drunkenness indulged in by
employees in charge of a train where unfitness may have the great-
est consequences to both life and property. The culpability due
to incompetence normally may be of no consequence except to
diminish the value of the service of the employee to his employer.
As Woodward suggests, the employer should normally be com-
pelled to pay him the value of his services, just as he should be
96Jensen v. Lee, (1903) 67 Kan. 539, 73 Pac. 72; Keyser v. Rehberg,
(1895) 16 Mont. 331, 41 Pac. 74.99Blenkarn v. Hodges' Distillery Co., (1867) 16 L. T. (N.S.) 608.
10OFuqua & Smith v. Massie & Sons, (1894) 95 Ky. 387, 393, 25
S. W. 875.
o'0 Pearce v. Foster, (1886) L. R. 17 Q. B. D. 536, 542, 55 L. J. Q. B.
306, 54 L. T. 664.
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required to pay for the services of an employee whose conduct was
sufficiently uncivil to be insolent.
The insolence of the employee who suspects his employer's con-
duct without just cause, and tells him so, can not be classed with
the employee who steals either his goods or his money, yet his
conduct may be as wilful. The deceiving single woman who
secretly marries, yet renders full service to her employer despite
her marriage, is not to be placed in the same category as the em-
ployee who enriches himself at his employer's expense by making
a secret profit or who by his disloyalty enriches himself or his
employer's competitor. When wilful conduct is fraudulent, when
it is wanton, when it is corrupt, when it is pernicious, society
may have such a vital interest in general morals that the law
ought to protect it by the forfeiture of wages. But where merely
the integrity of contracts is at stake, wilful conduct on the part
of the employee is no worse than wilful conduct on the part of
the employer and the law should recognize that fact by an equality
of treatment.
CONCLUSION
Morals is an evaluation of interests. 0 2 The wilfulness of the
conduct does not reveal the interest which may be involved in any
violation of a contract. Even if it did, the employee would still
be entitled to as favorable a treatment by the law as is accorded
to the wilful employer. The traditional precepts of morality which
crystallized in pre-Victorian England can no longer dominate
modern America. 103 Perhaps the most illuminating criticism of
this primitive approach of the problem is embodied in the words
of Dean Pound:
"Regularly the law begins by using penalties. Later, it learns
more effective and discriminating means of enforcing its precepts.
... Again, in the beginning the law dealt with wrongs of all kinds
by imposing a penalty on the wrongdoer. Later an idea of what
might be called a penalty of reparation developed. Ultimately,
the law attained the idea of reparation as appropriate to civil
injuries, leaving punishment to the engine of the criminal law. ,1104
In solving the problem of misconduct in the defaulting employee,
102Pound, Law and Morals 112.
1O3"No one would question the value of historical knowledge in the
solution of social problems, but the doctrine of precedent in law is some-
thing more than a responsibility to history. It is a custom, not only of
knowing what others have thought, but also of thinking that way one-
self. It is a habit of mind in which a stupidity may be perpetuated on the
grounds that it is well established." Robinson, Law and the Lawyers 30.104Pound, Criminal Justice in America 27.
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the fixative quality of doctrine has made wilfulness a preordained
category of vice, which facts contradict. Indoctrination has dis-
torted the law if it is to be judged by life. Society is less
interested in the preservation of the integrity of contracts and
the nature of the obligation which contracts impose, than it is in
the social consequences of wilful conduct. Wilful conduct should
merit a uniformity of treatment by the law except so far as a
diversity of situation between employer and employee dictates
penalizing by forfeiture the wanton, reckless and corrupt conduct
of the employee in the interest of general morals and social secur-
ity.
Quite clearly justice demands that the legislature should recog-
nize the fallacy of the doctrine of wilfulness as it is applied by
the courts to personal service contracts. Legislation should sup-
plant it by the doctrine of reparation, with specified exceptions.
The position of the employer and the employee before the law
should be a symbol of equality rather than an historic perversion
paraded under the banner of conventional principles of contract.
